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Abstract: A detailed review on the technological aspects of Blockchain and Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) is presented in this article. It stipulates an emerging concept of Blockchain that
integrates hardware security primitives via PUFs to solve bandwidth, integration, scalability, latency,
and energy requirements for the Internet-of-Energy (IoE) systems. This hybrid approach, hereinafter
termed as PUFChain, provides device and data provenance which records data origins, history of data
generation and processing, and clone-proof device identification and authentication, thus possible
to track the sources and reasons of any cyber attack. In addition to this, we review the key areas of
design, development, and implementation, which will give us the insight on seamless integration
with legacy IoE systems, reliability, cyber resilience, and future research challenges.
Keywords: internet-of-energy; smart grid; blockchain; artificial intelligence; cybersecurity; cyber
physical systems; data processing; encryption; cloud computing; communication systems
1. Introduction
The expeditious development in the areas of information and communications tech-
nology (ICT), cybersecurity, encryption, cloud computing, as well as energy systems has
led to the emergence of a new concept called as Internet-of-energy (IoE) [1]. The IoE is the
result of the implementation of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technology [2], smart senors [3,4],
and intelligent data analytics [5] with distributed energy systems. The foremost purpose is
to maximise the efficiency of the generation, transmission, digitisation, and utilisation of
electricity [6]. IoT technology enables the IoE by creating networks of smart sensors that
have numerous smart grid applications [7]. These include power monitoring, demand-side
energy management, secure OT/IT convergence, distributed storage, and renewable energy
integration among others as depicted in Figure 1.
Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) continue to move into a future, where
IoE [8–10] is driven by the combination of secure intelligent mobile-edge devices and high-
bandwidth communications with real-time data analytics [11]. These next-generation tech-
nologies lead towards virtualisation [12,13], security [14–16], automation [17,18], and dig-
italisation [19] capabilities that enable the use and management of more sustainable re-
sources in operational technology (OT). However, the utility sector still faces the challenge
of integrating the data and software subsystems [20] required with using complex security
protocols [21] and communication architectures [22,23] to unlock and enable the desired
functionalities. The quintessential solution for this challenge lies in the security framework,
virtualisation, intelligent cloud-based platforms for computational efficiency, data storage,
and implementing codeveloped cloud-based grid applications [24]. The cost of industrially
focused resilient and robust computing hardware can be substantial and dependent on the
number of edge devices required per substation [25] and the level of redundancy required.
For providing seamless hardware integration and cost effective solutions to the substation
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automation, the use of identification, verification, and virtualisation can be deployed to
provide cyber-secure remote access [26].
Figure 1. Basic IoE Framework. [Integration of information and communications technology (ICT), cybersecurity, encryption,
cloud computing, and energy systems to form Internet-of-Energy (IoE)].
When edge devices are implemented in IoE networks, they are vulnerable to external
cyber threats and are an easy target [27,28]. Not only are these cyber threats restricted to the
hacking of data contained on the computer itself, they may also use the trustworthy device
status to obtain access to other interconnected networks [29]. During the deployment
process or during the firmware upgrade, malicious hackers may take advantage of the
opportunities to inject unauthorised code to get access to the processing hardware. To create
counterfeits and clones, sophisticated cyber criminals or insider attackers with privileged
access to the devices may take advantage of unsecured manufacturing systems, resulting
in significant financial, environmental, and infrastructure disruption[30]. The security
frameworks and protocols are vital at remote or third-party facilities, where the devices and
the data-management is centrally connected via a control room [31]. Over the last few years,
there has been a tremendous interest in developing fit-for-purpose algorithms to include
IoT data and system level security/privacy [32–36]. IoT systems typically accumulate
big data sets, some of which require encryption depending on criteria for sensitivity or
compliance [37]. IoT data protection solutions must be an end-to-end solution, i.e., span
between edge to the cloud, provide scalable encryption and key management [38]. We have
summarised the cyber attacks in the IoE environment in Table 1. In general, the most
effective way to protect IoE devices in a fragile setting is currently by cryptographic
methods. However, when applying these cryptographic approaches in IoE networks,
power consumption and key storage are among the major concerns.
Blockchain has received world wide attention among the industry, the Government,
and academia alike to dispense security and privacy to the assets. Blockchain, sometimes
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referred to as Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), makes the transaction records of
any digital asset unalterable and transparent via decentralisation and cryptographic hash-
ing [39]. Despite using Blockchain in the IoT networks [40,41], there should be protection
mechanisms in place to verify and authenticate the edge devices through hybrid technolo-
gies such as Blockchain in combination with Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [42].
PUFs evaluate manufacturing variations in integrated circuits (ICs) and generate an indi-
vidual response for each device, also known as fingerprint [43]. This response significantly
varies from chip to chip and can be used for identification and authentication purpose.
Table 1. Taxonomy of attacks based on different layers of the TCP/IP model in IoE domain [44].
TCP/IP Layer Attack Attack Vector
Jamming [45] With radio interference
Physical Tampering [46] Making fake nodes
Collision [47] Transmit data at the same time
in the same frequency channel
Exhaustion [48] Multiple collisions and continuous re-transmission
until the node runs out of resourceData Link





Routing loops, changing the source of the
route, Repelling network from selected nodes
Selective forwarding [51] Send selected information
to the legitimate receiver
Sinkhole [52] Become the target of all nodes in order to
gather all information
Sybil [53] Create lots of pseudonymous identities
to undermine the authorised system
Wormholes [54] Re-transmit information to the IoT nodes
Hello flood [55] Use Hello messages to flood the
network with these tiny messages
Network
Acknowledgement spoofing [56] Spoof the link layer acknowledgement
SYN flooding [57] Resend request multiple times to
fill the capacity of the transport layerTransport






Data aggregation distortion [59,60]
Impersonate itself as a reliable node in
the IoT network and sends corrupted data
In this article, we have reviewed the hybrid use of PUFs and Blockchain for IC trace-
ability, verification and authentication in IoE systems. The consensus framework, based
on Proof-of-PUF (PoP), aims to guarantee authentication of the devices and the miner
with a rapid verification process compared to existing Blockchain consensus algorithms.
The combination of Blockchain and PUF allows us to propose an efficient framework
that guarantees data provenance and device integrity in IoT networks. This review con-
tributes to: (a) an in-depth market survey of the IoE systems and energy utilities, (b)
current research and development work on Blockchain and PUFs, their implementation
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methods and algorithms, (c) cross-disciplinary study of PUFChain approach that can si-
multaneously handle device and data security, (d) evaluation of the cyber resilience of the
PUFChain, (e) applications and use-case study of PUFChain and (f) research challenges,
issues, and future developments.
2. Market Survey of IoE
The global IoE market has been segmented by hardware and software based real-time
data analytics [61], security frameworks, data storage management, remote monitoring,
and others [62]. Among these categories, remote monitoring software in the energy sector is
projected to expand over the forecast period at a substantial compound annual growth rate
(CAGR). This can be due to the growing need for remote monitoring systems with devices
activated by the internet. Energy management also makes it possible for different end-use
industries such as electricity, oil, and gas and mining industries to reduce energy shortages,
further reducing running costs [63]. One of the key reasons driving the demand for Internet-
of-Things (IoT) devices and applications is the rising concern about energy management.
In 2015, the global IoE market hit USD 6.8 billion and is forecast to hit USD 26.5 billion
by 2023, with a CAGR of 15.5% percent over the 2016–2023 period. Factors such as
increasing globalisation combined with urbanisation are projected by the end of the forecast
period to broaden the IoE market by notable sales. IoE’s large market share applies to inter-
and intraconnected IoT devices. The number of devices connected to the internet now
exceeds the number of people on the planet. According to analyst firm Gartner, (Gartner,
Newsletter August, 2019) there are 8.4 billion devices—or ”things”—connected to the
Internet in 2017. By 2020 it predicts the number of IoT devices will rise to 20.4 billion
worldwide. Furthermore, this growth is not only in the home, with devices such as
smart TVs, smart fridges, and security cameras but also massively at the industrial level.
Increasingly businesses are connecting devices to the internet and turning them into
intelligent assets that can help drive greater efficiencies, increase competitiveness, develop
new business models, and provide solutions to problems. By 2023 new low-power Internet-
of-Things technologies such as lower-power wide-area network (LP-WAN) will help drive
the next wave of IoT adoption, with its promise of increased secure network coverage
and cost effective seamless integration. Furthermore, IoT can help businesses take up
other technologies such as cloud services, end-to-end lightweight encryption, Blockchain,
artificial intelligence (AI), and machine learning (ML).
Energy sector will be the highest consumer of IoT edge devices [62], totalling 1.17 bil-
lion devices in 2019 and increasing 17% in 2020 to reach 1.37 billion devices. In 2020,
domestic energy smart metering, which can be used for more intelligent metering and
forecasting, will be the top usage case for Greater China and Western Europe, compris-
ing 26% and 12% of total IoT devices, respectively, as compared to 2019 (Global Market
Insights, IoT Utilities Market Size, Growth—Industry Share Forecast Report 2024). In con-
trast, North America will see the largest acceptance of IoT endpoints in the electricity,
renewables, and asset security industries, comprising 8% of the overall IoT devices. De-
spite the progress made on standards and technologies, i.e., edge computing, LPWAN,
cloud integration, bandwidth allocations, private mobile connectivity and data analytics,
IoT ecosystems remain complex because of the unavailability of the unified standards,
lightweight security/communication protocols, and a unified firmware platform that can
provide the orchestration between the multivendor equipment [64]. The current fragmenta-
tion in IoT connectivity and technical solutions has impacted equipment costs and reduced
interoperability. The latest market survey (Ofcom, Data Assets, Final Report, April 2014)
focused on 12 key growth areas in IoT and found the complex nature of IoT ecosystems
but massive increase in the number of connections. The number of IoT connections in the
identified sectors are predicted to grow from around 13 million in 2016 to over 150 million
by 2024 in the UK.
The key variables driving the demand for IoT and intelligent edge computing, as in
Figure 2, growing industry-wide acceptance of IoT connectivity; increasing demand for
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low-latency and real-time, automatic decision-making solutions; and the need to overcome
the exponentially increasing volume of data and network traffic [65]. Countries around
the world are introducing edge computing technologies to increase the efficiency of the
energy market, EV infrastructure, building safety, home automation, parking and traffic
management, and community resources management with the growing drive into smart
city initiatives. Edge computing empowers IoT deployments in smart cities with low-
latency and high bandwidth connectivity together with cloud integration and data analytics
as a service. The advantage of this modern matrixed thought on the optimisation of
intelligent edges is that it:
• Improves responsiveness by reducing decision-making latency
• Increases data security and privacy
• Requires less power
• Uses less network bandwidth
• Maximises efficiencies, reliability, and autonomy
• Reduces infrastructure and operational costs
Figure 2. Statistics of Internet-of-Things (IoT) segments according to 2018 project and market survey
with increasing trends in smart energy, edge computing, and smart supply chain. (Data Source:
IoT-Analytics, Jan 2018. Based on 1600 enterprise projects announced world wide and not including
consumer wearable IoT projects).
It is also worth mentioning that 7% of all world-wide IoT projects incorporated the new
generation and upcoming Low-Power Wide-Area (LPWA) connectivity technology [66].
Approximately 64% of the projects are focusing on smart city initiatives, smart energy
infrastructures, mobile edge computing and industry 4.0. LoRa technology shared 37%
of these projects followed by SigFox (21%) and NB-IoT (19%) (IoT Analytics, Projects
Data, Jan 2018). The main value driver for most IoT enterprise projects is cost savings
(54%). Only 35% of IoT projects are used to increase per annum capital (e.g., by offering
new IoT-connected products and services). Twenty-four percent of projects also increase
overall safety, i.e., by offering enhanced telemonitoring systems with real-time emergency
notifications, authentication, and verification [67].
3. Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and Blockchain
DLT is moving quickly from theory to practical applications, transforming the data
management and exchange in a secure manner. Unlike centralised databases, DLT stores
information on synchronised independent processors, controlled by the individual partici-
pants in the network, which increases security, privacy, and interoperability [68]. DLT is
an umbrella technology with benefits such as decentralisation, persistence, anonymity
and audit-ability [69]. While Blockchain is termed as the first fully functional implemen-
tation of DLT, as shown in Figure 3. There is a wide spectrum of Blockchain applications
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ranging from 5G/4G-LTE communications, energy utilities, health care, smart cities, crypto-
currency, financial services, risk management, Internet-of-Things (IoT) to public and social
services [70].
Figure 3. Implementation of; (a) Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and (b) Blockchain (Cen-
tralised Ledger).
More specifically, Blockchain technology incorporates a decentralised ledger that
operates in a transparent environment. Each block of the ledger contains data about
transactions that have been executed on the platform. The blocks are formulated by the
data information, hash functions and hash of the previous blocks, as depicted in Figure 4,
hash is a mathematical computation that fulfils the encrypted demands required to solve
for a Blockchain computation. A hash, like a nonce or a solution, is considered as the
backbone of the Blockchain network [71]. Hashing requires processing the data from a
block through a mathematical function, which results in an output of a fixed length. Using
a fixed-length output increases security [72] since anyone trying to decode the hash won’t
be able to tell how long or short the input is, as they are one-way functions. In order to
add a block to the ledger, every edge node of the IoE network needs to be verified and
identified. Thanks to this verification the system does not need an intermediary to check
transactions. Information stored in a Blockchain can never be deleted and serves as a
verifiable and accurate ledger of every transaction made within the system [73,74].
Figure 4. The basic block architecture of Blockchain and information encoded in each step.
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The benefit of using Blockchain algorithms in the IoE networks [75–80] is twofold.
It can not only provide data security and privacy but also can be used for the mobile edge
devices verification and identification [81,82]. For energy utilities, large amounts of data
are gathered from edge terminals or Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices; however, data trust
and security in edge computing environment are very important issues to be considered
for future OT/IT converged solutions, especially when the gathered data are fraud or
dishonest, or the data are misused or spread without any authorisation, which may lead
to serious cybersecurity problems. Blockchain can also facilitate the development of the
Digital Twins (DTs) in IoE, to guarantee secure, private and trusted traceability, accessi-
bility, and immutability of records, logs, and data provenance [83]. Beside the inherited
capabilities of Blockchain to provide security and privacy, the orchestrated Blockchain
networks [84] decrease system drop rate and further offload the cloud data-centre with
seamless integration in existing IoE ecosystem. The reduced computational workload from
cloud data-centre does not only help in saving the CAPEX and OPEX; it is beneficial for
the energy constrained devices and minimising carbon emissions in environment.
3.1. Blockchain Networks
The functionality and the performance of the Blockchain depends on the architecture
of deployed network. Based on the implementation, the Blockchain networks are broadly
categorised as Public [81] and Enterprise networks [85]. The pros and cons of the two
network categories are discussed in this section.
3.1.1. Public Blockchain (Permission-Less Blockchain)
A public Blockchain network is an architecture that can be read, sent records and
expected to be included by everyone in the world provided they are checked as a node and
anyone can take part in the consensus process [86]. The fusion of economic rewards and
cryptographic authentication using methods such as proof-of-work (Bitcoin) or proof-of-
stake (Ethereum) is primarily covered by cryptoeconomics. These Blockchains are generally
considered to be “fully decentralized” [87]. One of the disadvantages is the considerable
amount of computing power (resources) needed to sustain a large-scale distributed ledger,
especially in the densely deployed IoE network [88]. Shared Blockchain networks have a
means of shielding the end-user from the developers, establishing that there are stringent
requirements in place.
3.1.2. Enterprise Blockchain (Permissioned Blockchain)
Enterprise networks are often referred to as networks of private entities or consor-
tium. An enterprise is a Blockchain where consensus is managed by a number of pre-
selected nodes [89]. The consortium comes together and make decisions for the whole
network. Hence, it is termed as consortium Blockchain or federation Blockchain. In a
completely private Blockchain, the only drawback being that rights are held by one entity.
The Blockchain enterprise decreases processing expenses and data redundancies, removes
obsolete processes, simplifies record management, and avoids semimanual enforcement
frameworks [90]. This network architecture for densely deployed IoE networks is strongly
recommended. Since read permissions are restricted, enterprise Blockchains offer a higher
degree of privacy and protection [91].
3.2. Consensus Algorithms in Blockchain
A consensus algorithm is a process that allows users or machines to coordinate in a
distributed network [92]. These algorithms make sure that all nodes in the system can agree
on a single source of truth (verification or proofs), even if some nodes fail [93]. The need
for a single source of truth originated the notion of replicated database systems in order to
ensure resilience against node failures within an architecture. Such database systems ensure
that data is not lost when one or more nodes fail to function in an excepted fashion [94].
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In this section, we explore different incentivised consensus algorithms. Such algorithms can
be grouped in two major categories: Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [95].
3.2.1. Proof-of-Work (PoW)
In PoW algorithm, the probability of mining a block is determined by how much
computational work is done by the miner (verified node). A PoW mechanism involves two
different parties (nodes): prover (requestor) and verifier (provider). The prover performs a
resource-intensive computational task intending to achieve a goal and presents it to a veri-
fier or a set of verifiers for validation that requires significantly less resource [96]. In PoW,
the framework sets out conditions for what makes a block valid and verified. It might
say, for instance, only a block whose hash begins with 00 will be valid. The only way for
the miner to create one that matches that combination is to brute-forcing inputs. They
can iterate a parameters in the data-pool to produce a different outcome for every guess
until they get the right hash. With major Blockchains, it is cumbersome to compete with
other miners, as high performance computing and special hashing hardware (ASICs) [97]
is required to achieve the required validation of the block.
3.2.2. Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
In PoS algorithm, the probability of validating a new block is determined by how large
of a stake an individual possesses [98]. The core idea of PoS evolves around the concept
that the nodes who would like to participate in the Blockchain architecture must prove
that they own a certain number of coins at first [99] that can be translated as credibility
and experience. Besides, they must lock a certain amount of their stakes, into an escrow
account [100,101] in order to participate in the block creation process. The stake acts as a
guarantee that it will behave as per the protocol rules.
In recent years, there has been a lot of interest in developing consensus algorithms,
they are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Summarised Consensus Algorithms for Blockchain.
Property PoW [96] PoS [98] PBFT [102] DPoS [103] Ripple [104] Tendermint [105]
Node Identity Management Open Open Permissioned Open Open Permissioned
Energy Savings No Partial Yes Partial Yes Yes
Tolerated Power of Adversary <25%Computing Power <51% Stake <33% Faulty Replicas <51% Validators <20% Faulty Nodes <33% Byzantine Voting
Transactions (per second) 7–30 30–173 100–2500 25–2500 500–1500 10,000
Transactions Fee High Low Very Low Low Very Low High
Use-Cases Bitcoin Peercoin Hyperledger Fabric Bitshares Ripple Tendermint
3.3. Interoperable DLT and Blockchain Standards
Currently, under various societies, many standards-development projects are ongoing
around the world. Global Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs), business groups
and partnerships are undertaking these processes, with the latter requiring broad coopera-
tion from the implementation sector and the end-users of these platform-specific standards.
Most of these specifications are still being developed, with only a few versions released
for review; the vast majority are still in the early blueprint process. It is planned to release
further work and preliminary documents of these DLT/Blockchain specifications around
2020. The most important DLT/Blockchain standards currently under review are described
below.
1. IEEE DLT/Blockchain Standards: The IEEE is developing the IEEE P2418 series, fo-
cusing on generic frameworks and architectures, interoperability, building blocks
for enabling technology, and vertical industry standards [106,107]. In addition, this
system tackles the issues of scalability, security, and privacy in implementation and
service [108]. It covers different facets and features of Blockchain, including tokens,
intelligent contracts, storing of offchain data, as well as Blockchain that is both per-
missioned and permission-less.
Sensors 2021, 21, 28 9 of 32
2. ISO/TC 307 Blockchain and DLT: TC 307, driven by the Australian Standards Body
and the International Organization for Standardization ( ISO), is an important global
initiative. The TC 307 for ISO 307 is in its early stages. Architecture and taxonomy,
usage cases, protection and privacy, identification, smart contracts, governance, and in-
teroperability between Blockchain apps are some focal areas here. The first reference
design, privacy description, and security of publicly identifiable information will be
available by 2021 [109].
3. Enterprise Ethereum Alliance (EEA): This partnership is a member-driven associa-
tion of standards whose charter is to create transparent Blockchain specifications that
facilitate harmonisation and interoperability for global companies and customers [110].
With more than 500 participants working on transparency, standards-based architec-
tures and requirements to speed up the acceptance of Enterprise Ethereum, the EEA is
one of the most involved industry partnerships, focused on the creation of software
specifications and Ethereum enterprise certification.
4. ITU-T Blockchain: In order to examine the standardisation criteria of DLT-based
applications and services, the ITU has developed an open participation ITU-T focus
group DLT. The key emphasis of the focus group is the recognition and review of
DLT-based applications and services, along with the development of best practises
and recommendations to facilitate the global deployment of such applications and
services [111].
5. W3C: The W3C has a Blockchain Community Group working on a Network Ledger
Protocol (WLP) to produce ISO 20022-based Blockchain message format standards
and create storage usage guidelines, including torrent, public Blockchain, private
Blockchain, and side-chain storage [112]. This group will review and analyse emerging
Blockchain-related technologies and use cases such as interbank communications,
crypto-currencies, etc.
Essentially, the above mentioned requirements are commonly categorised as four types
of DLT/Blockchain, shown in Figure 5. These divisions are characterised by their points of
view, degree of depth, boundaries and demarcation, including industry cooperation with
each component of the device and subsystems covered by the technology. It is expected
that, in the coming years, there will be an urgent call for cross-chain interoperability among
different enterprise-grade (permissioned) and public (permission-less) DLT/Blockchain
systems, with various platforms interacting with each other to make the development
of DApps much easier and more pervasive [113]. Multiple side-chains (a special type of
Blockchain) will be needed and interoperability between these various network segments
will be specified using a common-ground protocol, a network agent (e.g., a gateway)
or a edge gateway [114]. This would be the ultimate prerequisite for the growth and
convergence of DLT technology as a future for decentralised networks and services.
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Figure 5. The classification of DLT/Blockchain standards.
4. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF)
Security and privacy have been a crucial concern in IoE applications in recent years [115].
In fact, IoT Edge technologies have arisen as one of the most serious problems due to
electronic devices entering any aspect of smart city applications or energy utilities [116,117].
In addition, due to the trend in globalisation, system integrators have had to cope more than
ever with integrated circuit (IC)/intellectual property (IP) counterfeiting. This counterfeit
hardware has motivated the need for error-free safe chip authentication, as standard ID or
key verification algorithms have been shown to be vulnerable to different forms of cyber
attacks [118].
As edge devices become ubiquitous and interconnected in IoE networks must rely
on Integrated Circuits (ICs) for data protection and privacy. Providing this protection
relies on well-established key generation, data confidentiality and integrity, authentication,
and identification [119]. It is therefore necessary for ICs to be able to provide plug-and-play
protection in a cost-effective manner. Unfortunately, the classical methodologies [120–122]
(e.g., digital signatures, encryption, etc.) suffer from numerous weaknesses; they are very
sluggish, computationally exhaustive, costly, and increasingly susceptible to physical and
side-channel attacks.
Hardware-based security paradigms such as Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [123]
and True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) [124] can transcend these limitations
and provide random functions on edge modules to create security and reliability for IoE
systems. PUFs can be used to retrieve hardware-based chip signatures and eruptive private
keys, while TRNGs are used to generate random bits, initialisation vectors and nonces in
encryption protocols. It should be remembered that whilst these paradigms will benefit
ICs [125,126], there are physical properties and chip architectures that need to be addressed
(e.g., power consumption, overhead, heat).
Since IoE and the digitization of energy utilities is a rapidly evolving model, protection
and privacy of devices and data are the most challenging criteria for their widespread
implementation. Using hardware-based security primitives integrating PUFs [127] and
TRNGs [128], it is possible to apply cost-effective security solutions to a large-scale IoT
sensor network and even Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) sector. Providing a stable envi-
ronment and forum for IoE systems will defend them from malicious cyber attacks. One of
the most critical issues for the production of stable IoT devices is the restricted resource
existence of the edge devices. Security historically needs a significant amount of comput-
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ing capital to perform the computations required for encryption, certificate verification,
third-party authentication, etc. By integrating hardware security primitives, i.e., PUFs
and TRNGs, developers can easily solve restricted IoT resource reliability and verifiability
issues in a cost-effective and efficient manner. In the following sections we shall look into
comprehensive details of working and implementation of PUFs for IoE systems [129].
4.1. Basics of PUFs
Small differences in the semiconductor manufacturing process make each transistor
and each piece of silicon unique. This variants are spontaneous and obtrusive, because it
is impossible to create an exact replica of an IC, so we refer to it as Physically Unclonable
Function or PUF [130], as depicted in Figure 6a. These differences can be amplified and
tested with the normal built-in Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) cells [131] and
the start-up activity of the SRAM chip results in a distinctive pattern that is similar to
the IC fingerprint. There are two basic conditions for constructing a PUF: spontaneous
and uncontrollable variants. Variations must be random, minimising the probability of
producing the same signature [132]. Often, variants must be uncontrollable in such a
manner where the adversary cannot replicate the units. The input and output of the PUFs
maps a particular set of challenges to the corresponding answer set called Challenge-
Response Pairs (CRPs) as shown in Figure 6b. In other words, PUF is a multiple-input
(challenges) multiple-output (responses) function that has a dependency on outputs and
inputs. The functional relationship between challenge and response is close to that of the
random function [133]. Since the PUF is extracted from random process variance, it is very
challenging, if not impossible, to predict the answer from a specific problem or to create a
function to do so in hardware or software.
Figure 6. (a) Basic design and (b) authentication process of Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) chip.
4.1.1. Implementation of PUFs
PUFs are gradually being used as the root-of-trust hardware for the protection and
privacy of IoT devices, data, and services. In order to implement stable applications,
the development process variation of the IC can be explicitly used as a source of randomness
for the generation of device-unique cryptographic keys, as illustrated in Figure 7. They
required minimum on-board power to function as well as memory based on regular
SRAM cells (1 kbyte minimum) [134]. In most IoT implementations, edge devices transmit
data to the central gateway. It is important to preserve the quality and privacy of these
data from the sensors. To preserve the confidentiality of the data to guarantee that it
cannot be tampered with, the data can be secured by encrypting the date with the PUF
key or mechanisms such as the Message Authentication Code (MAC) and the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) 256 [135].
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Figure 7. Flow of PUF technology used for secure key management.
The two broad types of application of PUFs are intrinsic and extrinsic [136]. Extrinsic
PUFs depend on certain external stimulus to produce CRPs, e.g., light for an optical PUF.
Intrinsic PUFs, on the other hand, are those that rely on the inherited internal manufac-
turing semiconductor properties (process variations) of the system. These implementa-
tion methods are summarised in Table 3. The most commonly deployed, cost-effective,
and low-energy implementation of PUF is fundamentally the weak SRAM PUF [137,138].
Weak PUFs are basically a modern way to store cryptographic keys on insecure hardware,
providing an alternative to read-only memory (ROM), Flash, or other nonvolatile memory
(NVMs). Like all PUFs, Weak PUFs have internal, unclonable physical properties, and some
sort of challenge-response mechanism that exploits this unusual fingerprint.
Table 3. PUFs Taxonomy based on Origin of Stimulus.
PUFs Taxonomy
Intrinsic Extrinsic
Memory-Based Delay-Based Miscellaneous Generic
DRAM PUF [139] Arbiter PUF [140] Metal Based PUF [141] Optical PUF [142]
SRAM PUF [138,143] XOR Arbiter PUF [144] Photonic PUF [145] Coating PUF [146]
MRAM PUF [147] Butterfly PUF [148] Glitch PUF [149]
Flash Memory PUF [150] Bistable Ring PUF [151] Quantum Confinement PUF [152]
Ring Oscillator PUF [153]
4.1.2. Working of PUFs
Due to differences in the semiconductor manufacturing process, each transistor in an
IC has various physical properties as shown in Figure 7. These contribute to minor but ob-
servable variations in threshold voltage electronics and gain factors [154]. Although these
IC processes’ differences are not completely controllable during development, these phys-
ical unit properties cannot be replicated or cloned. Threshold voltages are sensitive to
external factors such as temperature and voltage, meaning that their values cannot be used
explicitly as special hidden keys or identifiers. Specifically, the activity of the SRAM cell
depends on the difference in the threshold voltages of the transistors. Even the slightest
variations will be exacerbated and the SRAM cell will be driven into one of the two stable
states. Thus, the achieved functional-state is more stable than the underlying threshold
voltages, making it the simplest way to use the threshold voltages to create a specific
fingerprint [155].
The SRAM memory consists of intertwined SRAM cells. Each SRAM cell consists of
two cross-coupled inverters, each consisting of a p- and n-MOS transistor. When the power
is added to the SRAM cell, its logical state is determined by the relationship between the
threshold voltages of the p-MOS transistors in the inverters. The transistor that begins the
first operation decides the result, the logical “0” or “1”. It turns out that every SRAM cell
has its own favoured state every time the SRAM is powered due to random variations
in threshold voltages. This choice is independent of the preference of the adjacent cells
and is independent of the position of the cell on the chip or wafer. Hence an SRAM
region yields a unique and random pattern of 0’s and 1’s based on the stimulus applied,
as depicted in Figure 6b (i.e., challenges and responses). The long-lasting and reliable
efficiency of SRAM PUFs over time makes them the perfect candidate for use in IoE systems.
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However, the noise characteristics of the SRAM-based PUF reaction have been extensively
characterised and evaluated under a wide range of circumstances and semiconductor
foundry processes:
• Temperature: −55 deg-C to +150 deg-C (−67 deg-F to +300 deg-F)
• Voltage Variation: ± 20%
• Humidity: 80%
• EMC Test: 3 V/m (EN55020 0.15–150 MHz and IEC 61000-4-3 80–1000 MHz)
The durability of SRAM PUFs under varied atmospheric conditions has made them
the leading candidate for automobile, energy, industrial, and military grade applications.
In all the above conditions, the average noise level of the SRAM-based PUF response was
found to be less than 15%. Despite this amount of noise, the high-entropy unit can be
rebuilt with a special and stable key any time the SRAM is operated [156]. This can be done
by applying error correction techniques [157], such as data algorithms and fuzzy extractors,
as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Enrolment and reconstruction phase for the generation of PUF keys. Note that R is the initial PUF response during
enrolment, while R‘ is a PUF response in the field with a noise component and error correction.
4.2. PUFs Standardisation
In this section, we will study the state-of-the-art mechanism for standardisation of
PUFs. Protection specifications are now being addressed in ISO Sub-Committee ISO/IEC
JTC1/SC27 (WG3) as document 20897 [158]. The ISO/IEC DIS 20897 manual defines
the protection specifications and test methods for physically unclonable functions for the
generation of nonstored cryptographic parameters. The primary reason for this standard-
isation is to structure and extend the demand for PUFs as solutions for nonmoderable
electronic chips identifiers. In addition, this paper further incorporates two redundant
protection criteria (i.e., diffuseness and unpredictability) into one (i.e., randomness) which
is a stronger output assessment metric for all forms of PUFs. The security requirements for
PUFs as mentioned in this document are given here-after:
• Steadiness: It is an indicator of the stability of the response time of the PUF. This ini-
tiative can be used as a protection necessity. However, PUFs with unsteady responses
may be prone to cyber attacks (if the response is very biased) or related key attacks.
• Randomness: It assesses the unpredictability of PUF responses when considering
the set of stimulus inputs. Ideally, the fingerprints collected could be unpredictable.
This protection criterion certifies the unclonability of the PUF.
• Uniqueness: It calculates how different the two pairs of different PUFs are. This inter-
PUF metric is necessary to measure the degree to which the semiconductor manufac-
turing process is not capable of producing PUF clones.
• Unpredictability: It calculates the difficulty of predicting the response of a (n+1)th
PUF that knows all previous “n” instances. This calculation refers to randomness but
is more realistic when it includes machine learning or ad hoc research.
• Unclonability: This metric means that no easy-to-use bias or parameter occurs by
nature in the PUF architecture. The purpose of this protection criterion is to verify the
absence of loop holes in PUF systems.
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There are various testing parameters that are discussed in the ISO/IEC DIS 20897
document, focusing on the reliability, unpredictability, and diffuseness [159].
• Reliability: Bit error rate of 10−9 (or less)
• Unpredictability: Entropy of 128 bit (or more)
• Diffuseness: Pearson correlation coefficient between challenges and responses of
10−9 (or less)
4.3. Cyber Resilience of PUFs
PUFs are gradually being proposed as central building blocks for cryptographic
protocols and security architectures for IoT and IoE systems [160]. Unlike other classic
cryptographic primitives, where the degree of security can be compared to well-established
security proof, the security of PUFs relies on assumptions about physical properties and
is a subject of great interest these days [161]. SRAM PUFs can facilitate IoE security by
providing integrated, lightweight cryptographic primitives for authentication, and certifi-
cation without substantial modifications to the design or manufacturing process. However,
extreme caution must be taken when developing IoE networks for edge-based PUF devices
in order to prevent pitfalls that could endanger protection. SRAM PUFs can facilitate IoE
security by providing integrated, lightweight cryptographic primitives for authentication
and certification without substantial modifications to the design or manufacturing process.
However, extreme caution [162] must be taken when developing IoE networks [163] for
edge-based PUF devices in order to prevent pitfalls that could endanger protection.
The most substantial cyber threat to the PUF edge devices are the attackers who can
provide the correct response to the challenges [164,165]. It is hard to replicate a PUF because
of the semiconductor properties, but with enough computational resources attackers can
predict CRPs with a modelling attack [166]. In this review, we are discussing two major
attacker models [129]. In the first one, the attacker is able to expropriate the communication
framework of devices in the field, whereas, in the second one, an adversary has physical
access to the device.
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
As stated earlier the security of the PUFs is dependent on the size of the CRPs. Large
set of CRPs make strong PUFs potentially vulnerable to machine learning assisted cyber
attacks only [161]. These attacks originates as MITM and hackers getting hold of the CRPs
database of the PUFs. Using this hacked CRPs subset the external hacker tries to process
the numerical model to correctly predict the PUFs responses against the challenges given
to the device for identification and verification purpose [167]. This attack can further
penetrate in the OT field deployed network in IoE, once MITM launches impersonate attack
on the neighbouring edge devices and get hold of information on the secret-key generation
protocol, i.e., device and data both are under attack. MITM attacks can be performed with
comparatively little effort in the IoE, since devices often connect dynamically to the central
gateways. An external hacker can place a low-cost computing device in proximity to the
attacked device and let it join the same (possibly encrypted) wireless network. Therefore,
the risk for such an attack is relatively high, and suitable defense mechanisms [42] must be
used, i.e., lightweight cryptography or Blockchain for the verification a identification of
the devices.
Side Channel Attacks
This type of cyber attack originates when the adversary physically get access to the
device. They can be classified as invasive, semi-invasive, and noninvasive attacks [168].
Invasive attacks are the type of cyber threat where the hacker gets hold of the physical
device and accesses the internal circuitry. Though it is not very common, as any physical
access can damage the PUF chip but there are reports that prove that PUFs are in fact
vulnerable against invasive attacks, including creating a full physical clone of a PUF [169].
Usually these attacks need proper knowledge of input/output interfaces, communication
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protocols, and penetration testing skills. Above all, physical access to the device made
these attacks less attractive in modern smart grid applications. Moreover, physical cloning
needs the replication of time delay, synchronisation, and error correction modules along
with the PUF chip, making it hard to achieve the right combination to get exact CRPs.
Timing attacks, power monitoring attacks, electromagnetic attacks and differential
fault detection are prominent attacks in this group [170]. Timing attacks generally require
mathematical analysis of the timing required by a CPU to carry out cryptographic op-
erations and thereby decide the secret key. However, instead of secret keys, PUFs use
a challenge response system and it is considerably more difficult to calculate the timing
delays of a circuit in an IC, reliably. Power monitoring attacks depend on monitoring
power usage during computations. We may, however, make PUFs stable against these
attacks by designing the PUF in such a way that the number of zeros and ones in the
latches is constant. Whereas, in electromagnetic attacks, PUFs are exploited by inserting
faults into protection hardware by exposing it to irregular environmental conditions, as
differential fault analysis is done. Although PUFs are pretty sensitive to the environmental
conditions, these attacks can be mitigated by opting for a delay-based modification in the
PUF design [171].
A few other prominent attack [128] types in PUF devices are:
• Overbuilding: These types of cyber attacks originate because of the lack of intellectual
property (IP) on the chip information or devices. The extra devices can be then sold in
open market. The design could also be sold to third parties and PUF devices can be
replicated easily.
• Theft-of-Service: In the era of digitisation, the edge devices are virtualised with
different services and processing algorithms from the cloud. In case of any adversary
on the IoE nodes, the services not authorised to some of the nodes can be accessed by
creating a perfect clone or CRPs.
• Denial-of-Service: The regular upgradation of the edge devices in IoE should be
audited and encrypted. For any malicious node, if it can get the respective upgraded
firmware code it can launch the cyber attacks. This results in the malfunctioning of the
operations and denial-of-service attack. The PUF developer should design firmware
update procedures very securely to make sure they cannot be used without proper
authentication.
The PUF modules can be modified to mitigate the external cyber attacks. One of the
well-known solutions is Controlled Physical Unclonable Functions (C-PUFs) [44]. The C-
PUF is accomplished in this scheme using several layers. For example, by avoiding a
chosen challenge attack on PUF, one random hash function before the PUF can be modelled
to avoid the MITM attack. This strategy does not allow the hacker to extract the PUF
parameters using the model-based adversary attack. In order to have another layer of
security, an error correcting code is placed after the PUF output to reduce the noisy
output measurements which result in more resilient responses. The second solution for
mitigating the cyber attack is via Public Physical Unclonable Functions (P-PUFs) [172].
This methodology is used to prevent the side-channel attacks by delaying the response
from the gates (XOR).
The IoE network designers can have end-to-end system security by opting the hybrid
software-hardware approach. Software encryption is deemed to be cost-effective and
relatively easy to implement and update [173]. However, software security is relatively
easy to modify, and malware can infiltrate or penetrate the software. Hardware-based
security is known to be a more powerful choice for IoE. Hardware protection makes it
impossible for the OT networks to breach [174] because it is hard to adjust the physical layer
and protect ICs with the root of confidence. CRPs should be encrypted and installed in the
safe ROM of the microcontroller, the root of confidence includes trustworthy functionality
that can be used to validate and authenticate the [175] software signature of the program.
By introducing a hardware-based root-of-trust, designers will basically close more possible
entry points into their work.
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5. Proof-of-PUF Authentication in IoE
Data management, security and privacy of data, devices, and individual SCADA
systems are some of the key aspects in the IoE architecture that need to be resolved.
Integrating the Blockchain into the IoE environment can help solve these issues and helps
in achieving a unified secure data technology [176]. In this section, we will review the
implementation and the performance of a hybrid framework of Blockchain, based on the
secret computational model of a PUF [177–180], also known as PUFChain. The key factors
that make this algorithm a leading candidate for concurrent data and device security in an
IoE network are:
• Key storage and key vault in high-security and mass-volume edge devices
• Secure cloud integration (OT/IT Convergence)
• Preventing reverse engineering of IP and software
• Combating counterfeiting and cloned devices
• Securing FPGAs and ASICs
In an IoE environment, most of the devices are low power and low computational de-
vices. Various other characteristics of the devices, such as security and privacy, power con-
sumption, on-board memory, and ability to host computational heavy algorithms [181] be-
come bottlenecks when integrating a Blockchain environment into the IoE. The Blockchain
has been computationally intensive especially in a dense node network. So there are some
challenges that need to be dealt with before integrating it into IoE sector [182]. To overcome
this limitation, PUFChain has been proposed [177,178,183] for resource constraint devices.
The combination of PUF and hash decreases the numerical complexity of the processing,
making it suitable for integration into most scenarios. With the PUF’s ultra-low power
architectures, power overhead can also be drastically minimised to achieve low-carbon
networks. In addition, Proof-of-PUF authentication is known to be a lightweight consensus
algorithm that can easily guarantee protection and privacy in a scalable manner [184]. Ini-
tial findings [177] on PUF-based authentication showed 1000x faster processing times than
well-established PoW and 5x faster than previously recorded hardware-based solutions.
Transaction time reduction relative to hardware dependent implementations is 79.15%.
This is due to the fact that PUFChain uses a hybrid PUF and hash system that does all the
requisite cryptographic processing. The mining method is then offloaded to the hardware
module, which reduces loading times.
5.1. Hardware Assisted Proof-of-PUF Authentication
The basic network of the PUFChain architecture is seen in Figure 9. IoE systems
deployed in the sector, also known as Operational Technology (OT), track large quantities
of critical energy infrastructure data. The signature PUF and hash is applied to the system
at the OT stage of the PUFChain architecture. This lowers the computing pressure on the
edge gateways, decreases the bandwidth, and increases the latency requirements of the
stable IoE network [185]. A variety of transactions are initiated, validated, and linked to
the Blockchain for authentication and identification purposes. A two-step protocol was
proposed where, after the implementation of a new IoE device into the network [186],
the device needs to go through the enrolment phase.
The nodes in the PUFChain architecture, as in Figure 9, can be categorised into two
main types; (a) client nodes, that are responsible for data collection and broadcasting it in
the network and (b) trusted nodes, that are assigned the task to authenticate the end-node
devices and broadcast it back to the network. There are multiple trusted nodes available in
the Blockchain network that can extract the device ID, PUF challenge input, and the hash
from the block data coming from the clients. The trusted node obtains the response outputs
from the encrypted database by using the device ID. At the trusted node, the extracted
response, system ID, and sensor data from the block are sent to the hashing module and a
hash is determined. The node is authenticated and the block is broadcasted to the network
for the rest of the devices to connect it to their local Blockchains, if the hash in the block
and the created hash correlate with each other. If the hash does not match, the procedure
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is replicated with the device ID for the rest of the keys present in the encrypted database.
The block is discarded if none of the hashes correlate.
Figure 9. Networking architecture of PUFChain.
PUFChain guarantees safe OT/IT integration in IoE networks with reduced complex-
ity and also provides concurrent device/data protection. Centred on the Proof-of-PUF
authentication, Blockchain stores data that has been encrypted with identical PUF-derived
keys and attributes, offering immutable confirmation that data has not been tampered
with, in addition to providing traceability and straightforward auditing capabilities [187].
The protection of the PUFChain is dependent on the randomness of the PUF technology
as discussed in the preceding sections. For PUF responses to be more stable and immune
to foreign cyber threats, the number of 0s and 1s should be the same. For example, there
should be 64 0-bits and 64 1-bits in the output key of 128 bits. This makes the PUF response
more stable and immune to numerous attacks by [177]. PUFs together with Blockchain
are exciting cryptographic primitives. On the other hand, the commercial problems for
the large-scale implementation of this strategy in IoE networks are the probability of the
randomness and stability properties of PUFs. We should strive to mitigate risk factors and
develop effective error reducing strategies for PUFChain.
5.2. Enrolment and Authentication Steps in Proof-of-PUF Authentication
This section presents the enrolment and authentication steps of PUFChain based
devices [187]. The use-case under consideration in this review paper is a resource rich
edge-gateway communicates with constrained IoE devices in an untrusted field. The two
basic assumptions regarding this untrusted sector are that, since there is so little or no
control over the devices, device security is vulnerable to both passive and active cyber
attacks. The different steps involved in various phases of the Proof-of-PuF authentication
are presented in Figure 10. The first step, as explained in Figure 10a, is the device enrolment
phase. IoE usually have a dense operational network (i.e., 100s of devices). Those end-
nodes need to be enrolled and authenticated before they act as a client. There is a PUF
module on every end-node device in the network that can produce unique identification
numbers that are later used in the enrolment process for each device. The secure database
is linked to the multiple trusted nodes in the network. A collection of challenge inputs ((R)
and (C) functions) for the PUF module will be chosen during the enrolment stage [188].
These challenge response pairs are stored in the secure database that can be accessed by
the trusted nodes of the IoE network.
If the edge node is securely enrolled in the network, it becomes capable of initiating
active transactions authenticated by a trusted server, as depicted in Figure 10b. The edge
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devices in the IoE network collect data from the sensors and initiate the transactions. In this
case, the transaction data includes the sensor data obtained and the device’s MAC address.
For the rest of the nodes in the network and the trustworthy node, the MAC address acts
as the identifier. It is sent to the hardware accelerator until the transaction is produced.
It includes the PUF and the cryptographic hash can be computed. Before it is connected
to the Blockchain, the block that is broadcast to the network needs to be approved by
the trusted node. Once the block is received by the trusted node, the data (Dn) and the
hash (Hn) are retrieved, Figure 10c. These two parameters help the IoE network to verify
and authorise the edge nodes. In addition to the special identity that the PUF produces,
the MAC address is used. The trustworthy node gets the PUF keys from the secure database
with the help of the MAC address. To execute the cryptographic hash, the PUF key and
the data are sent to the hardware accelerator. The input data and the PUF key are hashed
and the denouement hash is compared to the Hn received from the node. If both the
hashes match, the device is authenticated. If they do not match, the process continues
for all the PUF keys that are stored in the database during the enrolment phase of the
device. The associated algorithms for all the three phases, as in Figure 10a–c, are explained
in [177].
Figure 10. (a) Device enrolment steps, (b) Transactions initiation steps and (c) Device authentication steps in Proof-of-PUF
authentication [177].
5.3. Hardware Implementation of PUFChain
Developments in electronics and wireless networking technology have led to exponen-
tial advances in a stable, mobile, and smart environment. This has resulted in an growth in
the number of appropriate mobile devices in many countries, a decrease in their cost of
manufacture, and a paradigm change from the physical world to the digital world. Due to
the density of IoE edge devices in the region, energy utilities opt for low-cost but effective
devices that can provide smooth integration [189]. Classical IoT systems are extremely
centralised architectures that suffer from a range of technological shortcomings, such as
cyber threats and single failure points. To overcome this bottleneck, IoT networks can
quickly follow a decentralised Blockchain-PUF model while retaining real-time monitoring
and control between end-user and edge gateways. Blockchain and PUF can complement
IoE by providing a secure sharing service where information is reliable and traceable.
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Data sources may be detected at any time and data stays immutable over time, thereby
increasing its security [190]. This section summarises the hardware implementation of
Blockchain and PUF based IoT networks, as depicted in Figure 11, using the cost effective
devices, i.e., Arduino, Raspberry, and Orange Pi boards.
For the cost-effective deployment of the Blockchain-based IoE network, a layered
approach has been implemented to simplify the hardware specifications of [191]. With ad-
vances in hardware technologies, edge devices such as Raspberry Pi (RPi) will directly
benefit from network resources by invoking state-of-the-art Representation Transition Ap-
plication Programming Interfaces (REST APIs). This layered, focused approach, as seen in
Figure 11 allows the IoE network maximum versatility for potential expansions and devel-
opers can substitute or install any new module without disrupting the rest of the [73,189]
infrastructure. However, it is important to know that not all forms of PUFs can be intro-
duced by using cost-effective hardware tools such as RPi. Decay-based DRAM-PUF [192]
is the most common technique that can be used in IoE networks. The implementation
design of the RPi is seen in Figure 12, with three key parameters: PUF address, initial value,
and decay time. The address of the DRAM may be used as a PUF identifier. The initial
value is the set of digital data that was used before the PUF query to trigger the PUF
identifier. In the PUF query, decay-time determine how long the DRAM PUF has been
disabled. These parameters are then compiled with the aid of the RPi Universal Asyn-
chronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART). Then the PUF query code running on the Graphics
Processing Unit (GPU) can retrieve these Central Processing Unit (CPU) parameters from
the mailbox. The programs running on the CPU and GPU can only communicate through
mailboxes [192].
Figure 11. Proof-of-Concept Layered Architecture for IoE-Blockchain Hardware Integration.
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Figure 12. Structure of DRAM PUF implementation on Raspberry Pi.
Researchers are still designing mainstream platforms for the deployment of Blockchain
in IoE [190], but few of them have earned positive consideration from the consortium,
i.e., Ethereum [193] and Hyperledger Fabric [194]. The summarised comparison of the
Blockchain platforms for creating IoE applications are given in the Table 4.
Table 4. Blockchain methodologies for designing IoE applications.
Platform Blockchain Consensus Smart Contracts
Ethereum Public and Permission-Based PoS Yes
IBM Watson
Hyper-ledger Permission-Based PBTF/SIEVE Yes
Multichain Permission-Based PBTF Yes
Litecoin Public Scrypt No
Waltonchain Permission-Based PoC No
Lisk Public and Permission-Based DPoS Yes
Edenchain Permission-Based PoS Yes
Quorum Permission-Based Multiple Yes
Moeco Private and Permission-Based Exonum Yes
HDAC Permission-Based ePoW,Trust-based Yes
IOTA Permission-Based PoW Yes
NetObjex Permissionless HederaHashgraph Yes
To test the viability of running Blockchain-PUF platforms on IoE devices, the execution
time to register the devices, sensor readings, data query, and block processing overheads
have been extensively analysed in [191] and are enlisted in Table 5. Blockchain based IoE
nodes can be implemented via Raspberry Pi3 [195] with 1GB on-board memory, Android
Things v0.8 operating system, CoAP server, Android Studio for integrated development en-
vironment, and programming language support such as Java, Python etc. Connection with
the centralised system and the IoE nodes usually uses the restricted application protocol
(CoAP) while HTTP is used for communication between the system host and the Blockchain
network. It is critical that the architecture of hardware and network infrastructure should
be robust to significant network traffic. Although the hybrid Blockchain-PUF and IoE
research studies are still in its infancy, this review article explores the potential applications
of IoE and Blockchain to improve efficiency and bring automation, to revolutionise robust
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business solutions in energy sector. Current and future research challenges are discussed
in the later section, aiming at testing the interoperability of the cost-effective system with
different IoE frameworks.
Table 5. Performance Analysis of Blockchain-based IoE Hardware.
Service Execution Time (ms)
Device Registration Sensor Reading
Min Avg Max Min Avg Max
50 Devices 2262 2286 2375 1974 2490 2770
150 Devices 2257 2335 2801 1696 2679 3005
250 Devices 2254 2585 3004 2043 2767 3322
500 Devices 2267 2923 4013 2689 3012 4983
6. Applications and Use-Cases
The most common applications of PUFs proposed in the relevant literature [43,136]
include identification, authentication, attestation, secure boot, anticounterfeiting, and secure
key agreement protocols. Additionally, PUFs can serve as the basis for the implementation of
true ultra-high entropy random number generators. PUFs can also be combined with other
security primitives and entropy sources for combine data and device security, so that the
overall architecture will produce a divergent unique response for the same challenge, when
queried at different times. Since edge devices and PUFs are cost-effective monitoring solutions
for IoE [196], they can be incorporated in the network for the following applications.
• Authentication: PUFs on devices can be used for authentication and binding hard-
ware to software platforms, secure key storage, key-less secure communication in
the OT/IT convergence. Two different schemes of authentication exist, namely client
authentication and server authentication, both being based on the CRPs.
• Device Identification: The use of PUFs for device identification purposes effectively
turns the device into the authentication token. It reduces the necessity to store
cryptographic keys and look-up tables inside the device, which can be a cyber threat
and adversary can extract cryptographic material from nonvolatile memory. Instead,
the PUF device generates an transient key “on-the-fly” on the basis of it‘s unique
fingerprint, minimising the attack surface to extract the key.
• Random Number Generation: An important building block for many cryptographic
systems is the random number generator. Random numbers with high entropy are
required in these frameworks, because they are unclonable for potential attackers.
Since an interesting source of randomness is readily available in PUFs due to semicon-
ductor manufacturing process. This property can be exploited to use PUF as a truly
random number generator.
• Secure Environment: The idea of this application is to provide hybrid software-
hardware security and generate a cryptographic key. Subsequently, the key is used to
decrypt software, which is installed on the chip. The basic function is to decrypt the
boot-loader, which is executed first during PUF start-up or embedded devices. After
the boot-loader has been decrypted using the key, derived from the PUF response, it
subsequently unlocks the kernel, which in turn decrypts user space applications.
• IP Protection: The integrated circuit (IC) design flow is globalised due to increase in
design, fabrication, testing, and verification costs. While globalisation has provided
cost benefits and reduced the time-to-market, it has introduced several attacks such
as piracy, malicious modifications, and counterfeiting. IP of the devices can make use
of unique PUFs fingerprint to protect the devices.
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IC Traceability via PUF and Blockchain (Use-Case)
Driven by the continuous and exponential scaling of semiconductor manufacturing
technologies, integrated circuits (ICs) and their installation in the IoE have been more
complex than ever before [197]. The globalisation of the IC supply chain has raised the
possibility of counterfeit, tampered, and repackaged chips on the market with the least
protection from IP. Protection of device updates, firmware, and contact networks has gained
a lot of attention due to various hardware bugs, threats, and cyber attacks. The security
aspect of ICs and electronic devices has been restricted to a range of bugs and attacks,
such as side-channel analysis that exploits hardware implementation of cryptographic
algorithms for leaking hidden keys and invasive/semi-invasive attacks, as discussed in the
previous section. However, the credibility of the supply chain of ICs and electronic systems
is equally critical, as hardware derived from an untrusted supply chain cannot act as the
underlying root-of-trust hardware [198].
With the new developments in PUF and Blockchain [176], an end-to-end protected
IC traceability can be accomplished, thanks to Blockchain, a public immutable ledger
that holds an ever-increasing collection of data records (ICs, PUFs, and CRPs) guarded
from tampering and revision, as seen in Figure 13. The authenticity of IP knowledge and
traceability is a critical case-study for IoE, which refers to the combination of the ability to
know the actual possession of the edge system at all times (track) and the ability to find
the origin [199], the history of ownership, the time spent at each point (trace) by means of
registered identifications via Blockchain. The supply chain of semiconductor products, from
processing to installation of OT devices and product-life, is protected by blocks containing
PUF specific signatures, hash and time stamps, transactions, never forming a chronological
chain, as seen in Figure 13. It can make it possible to validate, record, and deter any
malicious party from modifying or questioning the authenticity of the information reported
by IP authentication and IC proprietary transmission of information [200]. This verifiable
and permanent ledger will also allow the identity and traceability of the IC across the
entire supply chain and its lifetime of deployment. Real-time monitoring of IP secured
devices across several supply chains includes a clear, tamper-proof meta-data network
architecture [201], i.e., edge computing and cloud convergence, which is not only trusted
by all stakeholders but also adaptable to changing markets and regulations.
Figure 13. IC traceability from manufacturer to the end-user via PUF and Blockchain.
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7. Current Challenges and Future Research
The promising and commercial implementation of hybrid approach, i.e., Blockchain
and PUF, is leading the security of smart grid applications. Despite the wide spread use
in IoE systems, there are significant challenges in the development and deployment of
existing and planned systems that will need further investigation:
• Blockchain Design Types: Decision from the energy utilities of whether your Blockchain
design will be a public Blockchain (generally open to participation by anyone and
not permissioned), private Blockchain (involving limited participation and having
permission structures), or a hybrid (Blockchain systems with both public and pri-
vate designs). Specially, privacy laws and data jurisdiction/sovereignty should be
considered for all of the digital data on the system.
• Scalability: One major technology challenge of Blockchain and PUF is related to the
technical scalability and integration of the network which can put a strain on the
adoption process, especially for public Blockchains. As more and more edge devices
are integrated into the legacy energy networks, they need to be verified, authenticated,
and orchestrated with existing Blockchain network.
• Standardisation and Interoperability: Another vital challenge is the lack of interop-
erability between the large number of Blockchain networks that coexist in the same
smart grid domain. The lack of such uniformity across Blockchain frameworks also
takes away consistency from basic processes like security, making network wide
adoption an almost impracticable task.
• Seamless Integration with IoE: This is the biggest challenge for energy utilities and
IoE systems to integrate the advancements with legacy systems. In most cases, if they
decide to use Blockchain and PUF, the organisations are required to completely
restructure their classical system or design a way to successfully integrate the two
technologies.
• Data Sharing and Access: Sharing and access to critical monitoring data is subject to
various privacy, legal, and regulatory laws. Decisions need to be made about what
type of data will be shared with the Blockchain participants. Thoughtful network
architecture is required to see if data will be stored on-chain, offchain or on a side-
chain, and the type of permission structures that will be utilised.
• Productivity Paradox: The effectiveness with which PUF and Blockchain networks
can execute peer-to-peer data transfer comes at a high aggregate cost/bandwidth,
which is greater for a dense edge system. This inefficiency come into play because
each node performs the same tasks as every other node on it’s own copy of the data
in an attempt to be the first to find a solution.
8. Conclusions
To comprehend the secure IoE development, this review paper provides the current
state-of-the-art on the Blockchain technology and PUFs by employing Proof-of-PUF as a
consensus algorithm (PUFChain). Devices constituting the IoE have become widely used
in energy utilities, therein generating a large amount of data from critical infrastructure
that needs an end-to-end security and privacy solution. The pragmatic industrial option is
PUFchain, which is an efficient security framework that can have a seamless integration
in an IoE network inherently having energy and processing power constraints. Classical
authentication mechanisms can no longer be based on simply storing secret data or PKI as
the secret keys on the edge devices that could get stolen or leaked. This issue is addressed
in PUFchain where physical properties of the devices are used as unique fingerprint and
recorded as a proof of authentication. The added benefit of PUFChain for the IoE networks
is that PUF key generated is not transmitted over the communication channel in the Proof-
of-PUF consensus algorithm which not only makes the system resilient to communication
attacks but also eases the bandwidth and latency requirements.
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